A remarkable feature of the crude oil market is a dramatic rise in oil price volatility over time which has been accompanied by a substantial fall in oil production volatility.
Introduction
The recent rollercoaster ride of crude oil prices from values of around 50$ per barrel at the beginning of 2007 to record highs of almost 150$ in mid-2008, back to values as low as 40$ at the end of the same year has attracted considerable attention of policymakers and the public being illustrative of the dramatic rise in oil price volatility. However, sharp and erratic oil price movements are not a new phenomenon but have been a dominant feature during the last two decades. 1 A related aspect that has almost gone unnoticed is that, while oil price volatility has increased, the volatility of world oil production has decreased substantially over time. Figure 1 , panel A displays the quarter-on-quarter rate of change in the nominal price of crude oil and world oil production for the period 1960Q1 to 2008Q1, whereas panel B shows the evolution of the median standard deviation of these two oil market variables over time, along with the 16 th and 84 th percentiles. 2 As is evident from the graphs, the amplitude of oil price ‡uctuations increased signi…cantly in more recent periods. 3 With the exception of the two sharp spikes in volatility in the 1970s, excessive swings seem a persistent feature of the nominal price of crude oil after the 1986 collapse of oil prices. World oil production on the contrary exhibited very wide ‡uctuations in the early part of the sample, especially during the 1970s, which gradually diminished over time. This diverging pattern of the two variables representing the global oil market is puzzling but suggestive of important transformations in the structure of the market for crude oil. In order to devise suitable policy measures for dealing with the increased oil price volatility, it is of great importance to understand its causes. The goal of this paper is to analyze alterations in oil market dynamics over time and to assess the factors that are at the origin of changes in the degree of volatility. More speci…cally, we investigate the underlying sources of the rise in oil price volatility and the concomitant drop in oil production volatility.
Several hypotheses could be put forward to account for the changed volatility of the oil market variables over time. Natural explanations can be sought in the evolution of the variance of shocks or the relative importance of di¤erent types of shocks a¤ecting 1 See Dvir and Rogo¤ (2009) for an empirical analysis of oil price behavior over the period 1861-2008. 2 The time-varying standard deviations of the nominal price of crude oil and world oil production in panel B have been obtained from the empirical model which is presented in section 3. 3 Other studies …nd the same pattern for oil price volatility by computing the standard deviation of log price di¤erences over rolling time windows as an indicator of changes in volatility over time (Regnier 2007) or by estimating GARCH models over di¤erent sample periods (Lee et al. 1995; Yang et al. 2002) .
the oil market. Increases or decreases in the size of certain underlying shocks alone, however, cannot explain the inverse evolution of oil price and oil production volatility. For instance, while greater oil-speci…c demand shocks due to changes in inventory practices or speculative activities have the potential to account for the observed increase in oil price variability, such a hypothesis cannot explain the accompanying fall in oil production variability. Similarly, smaller oil supply disruptions in more recent periods compared to the 1970s and early 1980s could be a source of a decline in oil production volatility, but are incompatible with greater oil price ‡uctuations. Hence, at least a combination of di¤erent magnitudes of the underlying shocks is potentially needed to explain the oil market volatility puzzle.
Other structural changes in the oil market over time should also be considered. In particular, a fall in the price elasticity of oil supply or oil demand can rationalize an opposite movement of oil price and production volatility over time. For instance, a less elastic oil demand curve implies that similar shifts of an upward-sloping oil supply curve are characterized by smaller adjustments in oil production and larger ‡uctuations of oil prices. Likewise, a steeper oil supply curve could be at the origin of an increase in oil price volatility and a decrease in oil production variability for similar shocks at the demand side of the oil market. Finally, a change in the degree of ‡exibility of oil prices could be relevant for the volatility pattern in the crude oil market. Before the collapse of the OPEC cartel in 1985, and even more so during the 1960s, oil market transactions were mainly based on long-term contracts with predetermined oil prices. As a consequence, large production adjustments were needed to accommodate changes in the demand for crude oil, at least for the remaining period of the contract. The transition to the current market-based system of spot market trading should be conducive to more rapid translations of oil supply and demand variations into price changes. As a result, smaller shifts in global oil production would be required to clear the market.
The contribution of this paper is to evaluate the validity of any of the above hypotheses in a unifying framework and to provide empirical evidence that the increase in oil price volatility can be reconciled with a decrease in oil production volatility once we allow the price responsiveness of oil supply and oil demand as well as the variance of the underlying shocks to vary over time. To this end, in the spirit of Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005) , we estimate a time-varying parameter Bayesian vector autoregression model with stochastic volatility in the innovation process over the sample period 1960Q1-2008Q1. Within this VAR framework, we identify three types of structural disturbances that drive the movements in world oil production and oil prices, namely oil supply shocks, oil demand shocks caused by economic activity and demand shocks that are speci…c to the crude oil market. These shocks are identi…ed by means of sign restrictions to allow for an immediate e¤ect of shocks on both oil prices and oil production which can change over time. 4 The key …nding of this paper is that the volatility puzzle in the crude oil market is mainly driven by a considerable decrease in the price responsiveness of oil supply and oil demand attaining very low levels since the mid-eighties. An important implication of these low price elasticities is that any small excess demand or supply of crude oil requires large jumps in prices to clear the global oil market. Put di¤erently, the steepening of oil supply and oil demand curves over time became a source for higher oil price volatility accompanied by smaller oil production movements. Unlike Hubbard (1986) , who views the transition from long-term oil contracts to spot market deals in the mid-eighties as causal to the rise in oil price variability, we suggest that the uncertainties deriving from greater price volatility encouraged the development of derivative markets. In fact, in our view the substantial swings in oil prices as a result of less elastic curves are likely to have fostered the shift from contractual arrangements to spot market transactions, stimulated the reliance on oil futures as risk-reduction tools and led to the introduction of crude oil options as hedging devices. 5 While these …nancial instruments were designed to cope with the rise in oil price volatility, it is conceivable that the expansion of hedging possibilities also played a role in lowering the sensitivity of oil consumers and producers to price ‡uctuations thereby contributing to the steepening of the oil supply and demand curves. In addition, our evidence reveals that the transition from administered prices to a market-based regime had hardly any impact on the speed of adjustment of crude oil prices and consequently oil price volatility when quarterly data are used. In particular, even before 1985, oil prices moved almost immediately to their new long-run equilibrium value following oil supply or demand disturbances, i.e. we observe little sluggishness in the behavior of oil prices over 4 Kilian (2009) disentangles a similar set of shocks by imposing short-run zero restrictions. However, a recursive identi…cation scheme which posits a short-run vertical oil supply curve is not appropriate for our purpose. In particular, this identi…cation scheme does not allow the short-run price elasticity of oil supply to vary over time. 5 Also Plourde and Watkins (1998, p.247) note that "since the early 1980s numerous market instruments have emerged to facilitate the management of the risks associated with crude oil price changes." 4 the entire sample period.
The changed volatility of the oil market variables over time is, however, not exclusively determined by the steepening of oil supply and oil demand curves but also by the magnitude of shifts of those curves. By means of simple back-of-the-envelope computations, we …nd that the variance of all three kinds of shocks has gradually decreased. More speci…cally, the widespread increase in macroeconomic stability, known as the "Great
Moderation", appears to have carried over to the oil market, i.e. we …nd smaller average shifts of the oil demand curve driven by shocks in global economic activity over time. 6 Furthermore, consistent with expectations, the average variability of exogenous oil supply disruptions was rather low before the oil shock of 1973/74, increased notably thereafter and remained relatively high until the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, after which it declined steadily. Interestingly, the variance of an average oil-speci…c demand shock is also smaller in more recent times compared to the 1970s and 1980s. This is in line with Kilian (2009) who argues that precautionary oil demand shocks were important driving forces behind oil price ‡uctuations in previous decades.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a small stylized model of the crude oil market to formulate the di¤erent hypotheses of the oil market volatility puzzle we wish to examine. Section 3 introduces the econometric framework, while the empirical results are reported in section 4. We brie ‡y discuss a number of factors that might have contributed to the steepening of the oil supply and oil demand curves in section 5. Some …nal remarks in Section 6 complete the paper.
A stylized model of the crude oil market
In this section, we set out a small time-varying model of the crude oil market, which should allow us to derive the di¤erent hypotheses apt to explain the changing volatility of oil production and oil prices over the sample period. In its simplest form, the crude oil market can be represented by the following demand and supply equations, measured as deviations from steady state:
6 See Blanchard and Simon (2001), McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000) and Stock and Watson (2003) for an account of the potential sources of the "Great Moderation".
where oil demand Q D t and oil supply Q S t at each point in time are respectively a negative and positive function of the equilibrium price of oil P t . d t and s t are positive values which represent the responsiveness of respectively the quantity of oil demanded and supplied to a change in the price of crude oil, i.e. the slopes of oil demand and supply curves at time t.
Furthermore, the supply and demand for crude oil are driven by two mutually uncorrelated exogenous shocks:
In equilibrium, we can express the price and quantity variables as a linear combination of the structural shocks hitting the oil market:
The period before 1985, however, was characterized by a regime of administered oil prices. In particular, the long-term contracts stipulated a …xed price for oil delivery over a certain period of time. Accordingly, oil producers had to adjust oil production in response to changes in the demand for crude oil until a new price was negotiated. At least in the short run, this supply behavior should be accounted for. We therefore allow the actual oil price to evolve gradually towards its equilibrium level:
with 0 < t < 1 the time-varying speed of adjustment to the new equilibrium price. If t = 1, the price of oil immediately re ‡ects its fundamental value, which is expected to be the case in the more recent decades. The actual (short-run) price and quantity equations of oil that clear the market at each point in time are as follows:
When oil contracts are fully ‡exible, i.e. t = 1, equations (6) and (7) are equal to their equilibrium counterparts (3) and (4).
According to this stylized model, and taking into account that oil supply and oil demand disturbances are uncorrelated, the variability of crude oil prices and oil production 6 are respectively:
Relying on equations (8) and (9), we can formulate all possible hypotheses about the sources of the observed change in volatility of both oil market variables. We now discuss them one by one.
A change in the variance of oil market shocks. A …rst possible source of time variation in the oil market volatilities are changes in the variance of the underlying shocks.
Keeping all other parameters of the model …xed, a change in the variance of oil market disturbances should have the following impact on the variability of oil prices and oil production:
Consider oil supply shocks. The 1970s are commonly perceived as a period of serious disruptions in the supply of oil due to military con ‡icts and political events, whereas more recent periods are rather characterized by minor disturbances on the supply side (Hamilton 2009a,b) . Accordingly, a reduction in the standard deviation of oil supply shocks can be a source of reduced volatility of oil production over time, but cannot explain the opposite evolution of oil price volatility. In contrast, smaller oil supply disturbances should also result in lower variability of crude oil prices in more recent periods, as can be seen from equation (10) . Hence, this hypothesis alone does not su¢ ce to explain the volatility puzzle.
The variance of average oil demand shocks could also have changed over time. On the one hand, the transition from the "o¢ cial price" regime to a market-based system of direct trading in the spot market, which took place during the 1980s, resulted in a shift of price determination away from OPEC to the …nancial markets and the development of oil futures markets (Mabro 2005 ). This evolution is often seen as the source of the dramatic rise in oil price volatility (Hubbard 1986 ). Equation (11) suggests that if oil demand shocks resulting from e.g. increased speculative activities, precautionary buying or preference shifts, were indeed greater nowadays, they would have the potential to account for the observed increase in oil price variability. However, while increased competition and speculation appear to be plausible reasons for more frequent switches from price increases to decreases, also this hypothesis on its own cannot explain the concomitant drop in oil production variability.
On the other hand, at around the same time of the break in oil market volatility, a widespread increase in macroeconomic stability has taken place around the globe, commonly referred to as the "Great Moderation". Several studies indicate that this remarkable decline in volatility is not limited to output growth and in ‡ation but also extends to other macroeconomic variables. 7 As such, smaller ‡uctuations in oil production as a result of smaller oil demand shocks deriving from e.g. economic activity or monetary expansions, would accord well with this general phenomenon, but not the increase in oil price volatility.
Since both hypotheses relating to the demand side of the oil market predict an opposite evolution of the variance of oil demand shocks over time, in our empirical analysis, we will make an explicit distinction between both types of shocks. In particular, we will identify oil-speci…c demand shocks and oil demand shocks which are driven by global economic activity.
Time-varying price elasticities of oil supply and oil demand. A change in the price elasticity of oil supply and oil demand could also play a role as can be inferred from the following derivations:
Baumeister and Peersman (henceforth, BP 2008) document a change in demand behavior in response to oil supply shocks over time. Speci…cally, they provide evidence of a steeper oil demand curve since the second half of the eighties. A fall in the price elasticity of oil demand in more recent periods could indeed rationalize the oil market volatility puzzle. This evolution is in line with greater oil price volatility and smaller oil production ‡uctuations, as predicted by equation (12) . 7 See Herrera and Pesavento (2009) for an overview.
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Time variation in the price elasticity of oil supply, with a lower elasticity in the more recent past, is also a plausible hypothesis to explain the volatility puzzle in the crude oil market (see equation (13)). Kilian (2008) reports that world oil production has been close to its full capacity level since the mid-eighties, which makes it very di¢ cult to raise production volumes in the short run when the demand for oil increases. Smith (2009) interprets this fact as the result of purposeful behavior on the part of OPEC suppliers who refrain from expanding productive capacity despite the ample oil reserves available for development in order to support cartel discipline. As a consequence, the oil market is characterized by higher oil price ‡uctuations accompanied by limited adjustments in oil production.
More ‡exible crude oil prices over time. Finally, changes in the speed of oil price adjustment subsequent to shocks are expected to a¤ect oil market volatility. The above described shift in the pricing regime from long-term oil contracts towards a more transparent system of spot market trading and the collapse of the OPEC cartel in late 1985
could have altered the ‡exibility of oil prices. If a greater fraction of oil transactions is carried out on the spot market, oil supply and demand variations are expected to translate quicker into price changes. According to our stylized model, an increase in the speed of adjustment of the actual oil price to its equilibrium value in ‡uences the variability of oil prices and oil production in the following way:
On the one hand, more ‡exible contracts do result in greater oil price volatility in the short run. On the other hand, the impact of a faster convergence to the equilibrium price level on short-run oil production volatility is uncertain and crucially depends on the relative variance of supply and demand shocks in combination with the price elasticities of oil supply and demand. Intuitively, since institutional arrangements in the oil market that prevailed until the mid-eighties relied on a …xed reference price for crude oil, adjustments to new demand conditions had to be carried out by adapting production volumes leading to wide ‡uctuations in oil production. On the other hand, …xing the price of oil should smooth oil supply disturbances, which reduces the variability of global oil production.
The net e¤ect on oil production volatility therefore depends on the relative importance of both shocks. If oil demand shocks were relatively more important in earlier periods, an increased speed of adjustment of the crude oil price to its equilibrium value alone could explain the oil market volatility puzzle.
Empirical methodology
It is very likely that many of the potential explanations come into play simultaneously.
While the theoretical demand and supply relationships are easily established, identifying them is more di¢ cult. In this section, we present an empirical framework that allows us to examine the di¤erent hypotheses jointly. Previous empirical studies about oil price volatility (e.g. Regnier 2007 ) note that the surge in volatility is not a one-time event but rather a sustained development which implies that the best modelling approach is one that allows for a slow-moving but continuous change as well as for potential jumps.
We therefore use a VAR framework that features time-varying coe¢ cients and stochastic volatilities in the innovation process. This approach enables us to evaluate time variation in the variance of shocks, the price elasticities of oil supply and demand, and the speed of oil price adjustment. We disentangle the structural shocks by means of sign restrictions. 8 In particular, we identify exogenous oil supply shocks, oil demand shocks driven by economic activity and oil-speci…c demand shocks.
A VAR with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility
We 
where y t is an 3 1 vector of observed endogenous variables that contains quarterly data 9 on global oil production, the nominal re…ner acquisition cost of imported crude oil 10 Our conclusions remain largely unchanged when this measure is used as an indicator of global economic activity. 1 2 The appropriate lag length is subject to debate (see Hamilton and Herrera 2004 ). However, our conclusions are unaltered if shorter lag orders are used. Including more lags would lead to a proliferation of parameters which is prohibitive given the time-varying nature of our model. 1 3 We have also experimented with shorter sample periods to initialize our priors. Given su¢ ciently di¤use priors, our results were not altered by the choice of the training sample. 1 4 This starting point corresponds to the establishment of OPEC. Even though the …rst decade of its existence was rather uneventful, we think that it is instructive to include this period in our analysis. See also Dvir and Rogo¤ (2009) for the importance of a long-term view for understanding oil market dynamics.
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Identi…cation
Building on the identi…cation scheme proposed in BP (2008) to isolate oil supply shocks, we extend the sign-restriction approach to the demand side of the world oil market. 15 More speci…cally, we place theoretically plausible sign restrictions on the time-varying impulse responses to recover the three underlying structural shocks we postulated to drive world oil production and the price of crude oil in the model presented in Section 2. The identi…cation restrictions are summarized in Table 1 . Table 1 : Identi…cation restrictions
Oil supply shock 0 0 0
Oil-speci…c demand shock 0 0 0
Oil supply shocks are disturbances that shift the oil supply curve and could be the result of e.g. overproduction or supply interruptions due to war-related activities or destruction of oil facilities. According to equations (6) and (7) of our stylized model, such a shock moves oil quantity and oil prices in opposite directions. After a negative oil supply disturbance, the reaction of world industrial production is also restricted to be non-positive. 16 Oil demand shocks are disturbances that displace the oil demand curve and hence, move oil production and oil prices in the same direction in our model. As already mentioned, there are two types of demand-side shocks which could matter to explain the time pro…le of the oil market volatilities. On the one hand, fears of future shortages of oil supplies or expectations of strong future oil demand growth which result in precautionary buying, hoarding and speculation, should have an upward impact on volatility. On the other hand, increased macroeconomic stability that possibly also translates into smaller disruptions in the demand for oil as an input factor in the production process, should reduce variability.
To examine both hypotheses, we make an explicit distinction between oil demand shocks Fry and Pagan (2007) for a critical assessment of the sign-restriction methodology in general. 1 6 Note that the sign conditions are imposed as weak inequality restrictions, 6 or > (except for the response of world industrial production after a global demand shock), which implies that a zero response is always possible.
driven by economic activity and oil-speci…c demand shocks. In order to disentangle the two kinds of demand disturbances, we impose the restriction that favorable global demand shocks unambiguously increase world industrial production, whereas oil-speci…c demand shocks that are not related to the business cycle have no e¤ect or even a negative in ‡uence on global economic activity.
The sign restrictions are imposed to hold for four quarters after the occurrence of the shocks which accounts for the delayed response of the oil market variables in the early period of our sample due to institutional arrangements (Barsky and Kilian 2002) .
In particular, the described stickiness of the nominal price of crude oil due to long-term contractual agreements and the sluggish adjustment of oil production plans in response to demand shifts should be captured. By the same token, also the global economy needs some time to adapt to new conditions in the oil market. The potential sluggishness of the oil market is assumed in response to all three shocks. 17 In this way, the identi…cation scheme is able to accomodate di¤erent historical settings in the crude oil market (e.g. cartel vs competitive market forces, contracts vs spot sales), the importance of which are likely to have varied over the sample period. The implementation of the sign restrictions and the computation of impulse responses are discussed in Appendix C.
4 Empirical results of disturbances. The decline of world oil production after an unexpected oil supply shock 1 7 However, similar …ndings are obtained when the sign constraints are imposed for shorter periods and even only contemporaneously which means that these concerns are probably of minor importance. 1 8 The 3D-graphs of the time-varying impulse responses are to be read in the following way: along the x-axis the starting quarters are aligned from 1960Q1 to 2008Q1, on the y-axis the quarters after the shock are displayed, and on the z-axis the value of the response is shown in percent. All responses have been normalized in such a way that the structural innovations raise the price of oil.
Oil market dynamics over time
13 follows a u-shaped pattern over time. The responsiveness of oil quantity continuously increases from the mid-sixties until the early eighties and then gradually dampens to reach the same modest level in the early 1990s as during the 1960s. Oil price reactions instead get more pronounced over time ranging from barely any response during the 1960s, episodes of greater reactivity during the 1970s to consistently stronger e¤ects from the mid-eighties onwards. 19 The same evolutionary patterns are observed after the two demand-induced shocks where the e¤ect on global oil production displays a hump-shaped course, while the impact on the oil price variable increases notably. The most striking regularity is the uniform, gradual rise and subsequent decline of the e¤ect on world oil production and the remarkable increase of the impact on crude oil prices in response to all three structural innovations with two obvious breaks in 1970 and in 1986, after which the strength of the oil price responses increases. In sum, the interaction between oil production and oil prices varies substantially across time periods which is suggestive of the fact that the global oil market has experienced fundamental structural transformations.
Evaluation of hypotheses 4.2.1 Speed of adjustment
To assess whether faster convergence to the equilibrium price level is at the origin of the observed volatility pattern, we look at the pattern of the dynamic responses of the nominal oil price at three selected points in time, which are depicted in Figure 3 , panel A. If sluggishness in the oil price adjustment were an important feature only in the early part of the sample, we would expect a gradual rise in prices but we observe that oil prices jump immediately after all three structural shocks at each date. 20 This feature emerges even more clearly in panel B, where the time-varying median responses of the crude oil price are plotted on impact and four quarters after each shock, along with the 16 th and 84 th percentiles of the posterior distribution for the whole sample period. Relying on these impulse responses, we also computed half-lives which con…rm our visual analysis that more than 50% of the ultimate price increase is complete on impact or after one quarter at all times indicating no change in the duration of price adjustment across time.
Thus, the degree of price ‡exibility appears to be more or less homogeneous over time, so that changes in the institutional structure of the oil market have not increased the speed of adjustment to changes in fundamentals as an explanation for larger oil price ‡uctuations.
Evolution of price elasticities
As noted by Hamilton (2009a) , it is di¢ cult to trace out the slope of the oil demand and oil supply curves from the observed movements in oil quantity and oil price because these two variables are subject to a myriad of in ‡uences which are hard to disentangle. 21 But since we have identi…ed the structural shocks in our empirical model that induce reactions in the oil market variables by shifting either the oil demand or oil supply schedule, we can derive estimates for the price elasticities of oil demand and oil supply at each point in time from the impulse responses as the percentage change in world oil production divided by the percentage change in oil prices. episodes in which a shift of the supply curve was the primary factor for ‡uctuations in oil price and production (i.e. political events or war activities) and computes elasticities from the subsequent changes in quantities and prices. However, no single episode in the oil market is an exclusive supply-side story.
Hence, this way of recovering a measure for demand elasticities constitutes only a rough approximation but it conveys the same message i.e. that the price elasticity of oil demand is even smaller now than it was in 1980.
15 decrease in the responsiveness of respectively oil demand and supply to price changes. 22 The early price-elastic period has been interrupted by the two oil episodes of the 1970s during which oil quantities demanded and supplied were not very reactive to increases in crude oil prices i.e. the adjustment in the aftermath of the shocks has not taken place via quantities due to the rigidity of both curves. While qualitatively similar, the price and econometric techniques are also quite low. 23 
Evolution of shocks
Once the price elasticities are recovered from the estimated impulse responses, we can also compute the evolution of the magnitude of the structural shocks over time by means of equations (1) and (2). on multiple regression models across 23 countries. 2 4 Note that as in the case of the price elasticities, the variance of the oil supply disturbances are derived with both demand speci…cations.
oil demand curve deriving from greater economic activity. However, aggregate demand shocks seem to have gained somewhat in importance in the early 2000s.
The evolution of the variance of oil-speci…c demand shocks might depend on whether these shocks originate mainly from fears about future oil supply conditions, changes in inventory behavior or speculation, with the role of the latter being the most controversial. production. Consistent with his account that speculation is likely to exert only a minor in ‡uence on current oil prices, we …nd that the variance of this kind of disturbances has decreased since the second half of the 1980s. However, the speculation-based explanation of oil price volatility is not necessarily linked to the variance of the shock itself but rather to the very low price elasticitiy of oil demand which, according to Hamilton (2009b) , is the essential ingredient for speculation to "work".
The variance of oil supply disturbances has been quite large during the 1970s and 1980s but started to decline sharply in the early nineties being considerably lower since 1995.
Again, estimates for the variance of oil supply innovations obtained with the oil-speci…c and global demand speci…cations di¤er only slightly. Consequently, smaller shocks have to some extent tempered the volatility increase of oil prices which could have been even larger had the variance of these shocks remained the same as during the 1970s.
Analysis of declined elasticities
So far we have documented a remarkable change in the magnitude of oil supply and demand elasticities over time. The most striking feature of this evidence is the similarity in the evolution of the slopes for both the oil supply and the oil demand schedules. Thus, the question is: what can explain the concurrence of these developments? In what follows, we argue that a con ‡uence of important structural changes on the supply as well as the demand side can account for the coincidence in timing. More speci…cally, we make the case that this apparent synchronicity is not coincidental but the result of demand and supply conditions that tend to reinforce each other. Mechanisms at work on the supply side relate to the market structure of the petroleum industry, institutional factors such as oil futures markets, capacity constraints and investment behavior, whereas factors on the demand side can be sought in economic and …nancial structures, oil intensity of production, technological advances and consumer behavior. Even though these proposed explanations for changes in the slope of the oil demand and supply curves are mainly based on anecdotal evidence and thus are speculative in nature, it seems worthwhile discussing them in that they constitute potentially promising avenues for future research i.e. incorporating these features in a theoretical model of the oil market to match the empirical facts.
Oil futures market. While the development of spot and futures markets did not a¤ect the speed of adjustment of crude oil prices to unanticipated shocks, the availability of oil futures contracts as a risk management tool has the potential to alter the behavior of commercial traders on both sides of the oil market. Re…neries and other oil consumers engage in oil futures trading to potect their business operations against unfavorable price movements by entering into a hedging contract. For instance, an airline company that wants to eliminate price risks associated with its future fuel purchases has to buy oil futures today to lock in the desired price for future delivery. Likewise, oil producers can lock in future sales revenues and pro…t margins and hedge themselves against declines in prices by selling oil futures contracts given their inherent long position in physical oil. As a result, both consumers and producers will be unresponsive to future price changes because physical purchases and sales of crude oil are hedged by o¤setting …nancial positions in the oil futures market. Despite the fact that only a small volume of oil contracts traded in the futures market results in physical delivery, 25 the fraction of total oil demand that uses oil futures to hedge against adverse price changes has little reason to adjust quantity in response to price developments since the desired price is ensured by futures contracts. Put di¤erently, opportunities for hedging decreased the sensitivity of commercial dealers to oil price ‡uctuations which contributed to the steepening of the oil supply and demand curves. Capacity constraints. Since the slope of the supply curve re ‡ects the ability of sellers to change the volume of production in response to price ‡uctuations, another important determinant for the supply elasticity is existing production capacity and the ease with which it can be extended. Figure 6 , panel A displays the annual global capacity utilization rates of crude oil production over the period 1970 to 2007 derived from IMF and DoE estimates of spare oil production capacity. Even though there are no data of oil production capacity available for the 1960s, we can relatively safely assume that during that period there were no e¤ective restrictions on oil supply in place. 26 This means that all adjustments to disequilibria in the crude oil market could take place by boosting oil production which is re ‡ected in a very elastic oil supply curve. When OPEC started gaining control over oil supplies and hence, the ability to restrict production, we observe the …rst drop in price elasticity.
While in the early part of our sample capacity utilization has been within a normal operating range, during the oil episodes of the 1970s oil producers have e¤ectively been nearing their capacity limit, 27 which complies well with our …ndings of a decrease in the price elasticity of oil supply in 1973/74 and 1978/79. These two price spikes spurred oil exploration and drilling and encouraged the development of high-cost crude oil reservoirs outside of OPEC which resulted in an overhang of productive capacity in the early 1980s.
In addition, Saudia Arabia deliberately pursued the role of swing producer at this time to promote lower, stable prices which required the maintenance of a certain amount of surplus capacity. 28 Both developments added to excess production capacity which in turn sustained a substantially ‡atter global oil supply curve. 29 The price slump of 1986, 2 6 In fact, Dvir and Rogo¤ (2009) assert that at that time oil production was far below its potential which gave the Texas Railroad Commission the power to increase or decrease oil supplies almost at will. 2 7 The maximum sustainable physical capacity is de…ned as "the maximum capacity that each OPEC country can produce at without damaging the reservoirs, while permitting itself long enough production life commensurate with its economic strategy" (Oil & Gas Journal 1989, Jan 9, p.29). Kilian (2008) considers capacity utilization rates close to 90% as reasonable for safeguarding the long-run productivity of an oil …eld. 2 8 This role was assumed by the Texas Railroad Commission during the 1960s. 2 9 Hamilton (2009a, p.202) notes that "this behavior on the part of Saudi Arabia helped to make the engendered partly by a steady expansion of supplies from non-OPEC countries, partly by subsiding global demand for crude oil since the early 1980s, deterred further investments in the oil sector leading to a gradual erosion of idle capacity over the years. When capacity constraints become binding, the ‡exibility of oil producers to o¤set unexpected oil market disturbances by raising oil supply is severly limited so that the adjustment has to take place via prices which implies a very steep oil supply curve. 30 Geroski et al. (1987) and Smith (2005) make the case that also the market structure plays an important role in determining the extent to which individual oil producers are willing to o¤set supply losses that occur elsewhere in the system and that their conduct (cooperative vs competitive) varies in function of excess capacity among other factors. Not only worldwide underinvestment in the oil sector has compressed spare capacity signi…cantly since the mideighties, but tightness in oil supply in more recent times also derives from the fact that demand has steadily outstripped supply thereby reducing any slack in oil production and that productive capacity of mature oil …elds has dropped in major producing areas (Hamilton 2009a ).
However, the presence of capacity constraints does not only a¤ect the supply side of the world oil market but might also have the potential to induce a di¤erent consumer behavior on the demand side. In fact, high rates of capacity utilization can put considerable strain on oil consumers in that they signal market tightness and hence, raise fears about future oil scarcity. Consequently, taut conditions in the oil market can alter the behavior of economic agents setting in motion a bidding process that drives the price of oil considerably higher for the same quantity of oil. This panic buying is the result of a perceived increase in uncertainty about future supply conditions 31 which makes market participants willing to pay a "fear premium" to shield themselves from potential shortfalls in oil supplies. Put di¤erently, each barrel of oil is of greater value to consumers given that it ful…lls an insurance function against sudden dearth of crude oil delivery in the future. 32 This means global supply curve considerably ‡atter than it otherwise would have been during the era when the kingdom had lots of excess capacity." 3 0 In fact, low levels of spare capacity erode OPEC's ability to act as a swing producer to balance supply and demand contributing to price volatility (e.g. Gately 1984 ). An additional bottleneck for quantity adjustments lies in the fact that re…neries cannot process all types of crude oil (Plourde and Watkins 1998). 3 1 The volatility of nominal oil prices can be viewed as a proxy for uncertainty. In Figure 1 we see indeed an increase in the volatility measures for the periods 1973/74, 1979 and after 1986. 3 2 This induced change in demand behavior (which concerns the slope of the curve) has to be clearly 20 that the share of precautionary demand in total oil demand increases when the oil sector is operating close to full sustainable capacity because agents anticipate that in case of a major oil shock, a shortfall in production volumes cannot be replaced by other producers since no idle capacity is left that could act as a bu¤er against abrupt interruptions. Alternative measures consumers could resort to are holding oil inventories or buying oil futures to mitigate the e¤ects of a potential supply crisis. 33 However, Alquist and Kilian (2009) show that oil futures contracts at horizons beyond one year are not liquid enough to o¤er e¤ective insurance against risks of future oil supply disruptions. Likewise, the role of oil stocks is ambiguous since storage can work either as a bu¤er or an ampli…er in the event of shocks as shown by Dvir and Rogo¤ (2009) . If stocks are built up in anticipation of a price rise or a shortfall of supplies, they are likely to contribute to a more inelastic oil demand curve. 34 Hence, a more rigid demand curve re ‡ects to some extent the degree of anxiety of oil consumers about the likelihood of future oil shortages. We …nd indeed a heightened sensitivity of crude oil prices to supply disruptions in 1973/74, 1979 and after 1986 which correspond to periods of low spare capacity. In the same way, expectations of growing shortages as a result of a lack of investment in productive capacity are likely to in ‡uence the current demand behavior of consumers.
Investments in the oil sector. Thus, the future development of spare capacity appears crucial to deal with the supply-and demand-side rigidities in the crude oil market which made oil quantity less sensitive to price ‡uctuations. However, in order to restore spare capacity as a bu¤er against oil market shocks, new investments in infrastructure, exdistinguished from oil-speci…c (precautionary) demand shocks; in the former case, oil consumers assign a greater value to the same amount of oil i.e. they pay a premium to ensure that they get this amount, whereas in the latter case, they e¤ectively want to increase the quantity demanded (i.e. a shift of the oil demand curve) for stockbuilding. 3 3 The presence of emergency stocks of oil established in the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo to cope with severe supply disruptions could also potentially work as a substitute for spare capacity and temper the impact of a crisis; however, releases from these public reserves are subject to administrative rules and political pressures. Therefore, the e¤ectiveness of strategic stockpiles to in ‡uence expectations and to dissuate precautionary buying is questionable.
ploration and development would be necessary, but as noted by Barsky and Kilian (2004) and Hamilton (2009a, p.199 The same reasoning can be applied to the decision of investing in additional production capacity. 3 6 Political impediments for the expansion of capacity can be sought in fear of expropriation, a resurgence of "resource nationalism" i.e. refusal of foreign direct investments and concerns about rapid depletion of oil resources i.e. preservation of oil reserves for future generations.
Economic structure in oil-importing countries. In addition to the e¤ects of capacity constraints and investment prospects on the slope of the oil demand curve, the price elasticity of oil demand is also subject to transformations of economic structures in oil-importing countries as discussed in BP (2008). 37 During the 1960s, the perceived abundance of crude oil at times of falling prices induced consumers to extend oil use considerably which implies a relatively ‡at oil demand curve. Instead, in response to the oil price hikes of the 1970s, industrialized economies have markedly reduced the quantity of oil required to produce a given unit of real output by substituting away from oil to alternative sources of energy and developing more energy-e¢ cient technologies. As a result of this gradual restructuring process, oil consumption has been compressed to a minimum level which makes it relatively more di¢ cult to achieve further reductions in response to rising prices. Hence, the minor oscillations observed in the elasticities from 1986 onwards do not seem implausible as oil consumers make small but delayed adjustments to previous price changes. In emerging economies instead, consumers are insulated from world market prices as governments drive a wedge between domestic retail prices and international oil prices by gasoline subsidies, import tax refunds and price caps on petroleum products which is prone to contribute to a more inelastic oil demand curve.
In sum, the interplay between developments on the supply side of the crude oil market that trigger reactions on the demand side which in turn a¤ect the production behavior can rationalize the uniformity in the evolution of both price elasticities. 38 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the underlying sources of the observed rise in oil price volatility and the drop in oil production volatility which characterize the crude oil market.
Several hypotheses have been put forward in the literature as to why either one has changed but no explanation has been provided yet that can account for the development of both and hence, rationalize this volatility disconnect.
We have derived a set of hypotheses from a simple demand and supply model for 3 7 For a detailed account of changes in the role and share of oil in the economy over time and their in ‡uence on demand behavior, we refer to BP (2008) and references therein. sign restrictions. This speci…cation serves both our purposes: …rst, to derive short-run price elasticities of oil supply and demand that are not a priori restricted to be zero on impact and second, to trace the evolution of the slopes of oil supply and demand curves, the structural shocks and the degree of price ‡exibility over time.
We …nd that, while the variance of the shocks decreases over time and hence, changes in the shocks alone are not large enough to explain the observed swings in oil prices, the main reason for the higher oil price volatility and smaller oil production volatility in more recent times is the steepness of oil supply and oil demand curves. Put di¤erently, both curves are so inelastic that even small disturbances generate huge price jumps but only moderate quantity adjustments. Thus, the apparent volatility puzzle is resolved once we take the steepening of the oil supply and demand curves into account which re ‡ects alterations in the supply and demand behavior as a consequence of structural transformations in the oil market and oil-importing countries. We cannot con…rm the hypothesis that the transition from long-term contracts to spot market sales has altered the speed of adjustment of oil prices to fundamental shocks over the sample period. Rather, we conjecture that the marked surge in oil price volatility after 1986 has fostered the deepening of spot and futures markets to deal with the increased uncertainty regarding the future course of oil prices.
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A Data appendix
The world index of industrial production is taken from the United Nations Monthly Bul- 
where Y t is a 3 1 vector of observations of the dependent variables, X t is a matrix including lags (p = 4) of all the dependent variables and a constant term, and t is a 3(3p+1) 1
vector of states which contains the time-varying parameters. The u t of the measurement equation are heteroskedastic disturbance terms with zero mean and a time-varying covariance matrix t which can be decomposed in the following way:
A t is a lower triangular matrix that models the contemporaneous interactions among the endogenous variables and H t is a diagonal matrix which contains the stochastic volatilities: 
Let t be the vector of non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix A t (stacked by rows) and h t be the vector containing the diagonal elements of H t . Following Primiceri (2005), the three driving processes of the system are postulated to evolve as follows:
ln h i;t = ln h i;t 1 + i i;t i;t
The time-varying parameters t and t are modeled as driftless random walks. 41 The elements of the vector of volatilities h t = [h 1;t ; h 2;t ; h 3;t ] 0 are assumed to evolve as geometric random walks independent of each other. 42 The error terms of the transition equations are independent of each other and of the innovations of the observation equation. In addition,
we impose a block-diagonal structure for S of the following form: 
From the terminal state of the forward Kalman …lter, the backward recursions produce the required smoothed draws which take the information of the whole sample into account.
More speci…cally, the last iteration of the …lter provides the conditional mean T jT and variance P T jT of the posterior distribution. A draw from this distribution provides the input for the backward recursion at T 1 and so on until the beginning of the sample according to:
Step 2: Drawing covariance states Similarly, the posterior of A T conditional on T , H T , and Y T is a product of normal densities and can be calculated by applying the same algorithm as in step 1 thanks to the block diagonal structure of the variance covariance matrix S. More speci…cally, a system of unrelated regressions based on the following relation: A t u t = " t , where " t are orthogonalized innovations with known time-varying variance H t and u t = y t X 0 t t are observable residuals, can be estimated to recover A T according to the following transformed equations where the residuals are independent standard normal: Step 3: Drawing volatility states
Conditional on T , A T , and Y T , the orthogonalized innovations " t A t (y t X 0 t t ), with V ar (" t ) = H t , are observable. However, drawing from the conditional posterior of H T is more involved because the conditional state-space representation for ln h i;t is not Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (1994) that draws the volatility states h i;t one at a time. 43 Step 4: Drawing hyperparameters
The hyperparameters M of the model can be drawn directly from their respective posterior distributions since the disturbance terms of the transition equations are observable given T ; A T ; H T and Y T .
We perform 50,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler but keep only every 10 th draw in order to mitigate the autocorrelation among the draws. After a "burn-in" period of 50,000
iterations, the sequence of draws of the four blocks from their respective conditional posteriors converges to a sample from the joint posterior distribution p
We ascertain that our chain has converged to the ergodic distribution by performing the usual set of convergence tests (see Primiceri 2005; Benati and Mumtaz 2007) . 44 In total, we collect 5000 simulated values from the Gibbs chain on which we base our structural analysis.
C Impulse responses and sign restrictions
Here we describe the Monte Carlo integration procedure we use to compute the path of impulse response functions to our three structural shocks. In the spirit of Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) we compute the generalized impulse responses as the di¤erence between two conditional expectations with and without exogenous shocks:
where y t+k contains the forecasts of the endogenous variables at horizon k, ! t represents the current information set and " t is a vector of current disturbance terms. At each point in time the information set we condition upon contains the actual values of the lagged endogenous variables and a random draw of the model parameters and hyperparameters.
More speci…cally, in order to calculate the conditional expectations we simulate the model in the following way: We randomly draw one possible state of the economy at time t from the Gibbs sampler output represented by the time-varying lagged coe¢ cients and the elements of the variance covariance matrix. Starting from this random draw from the joint posterior including hyperparameters, we stochastically simulate the future paths of the coe¢ cient vector as well as the (components of the) variance covariance matrix based on the transition laws for 20 quarters into the future. 45 By projecting the evolution of the system into the future in this way, we account for all the potential sources of uncertainty deriving from the additive innovations, variations in the lagged coe¢ cients and changes in the contemporaneous relations among the variables in the system. 4 4 The results of these convergence diagnostics are available upon request. 4 5 Alternatively, one could draw the entire time-varying path of current and future coe¢ cients and covariances from the Gibbs sampler for the horizon k over which one wants to study the dynamics of the system. However, in order to be able to analyse the system dynamics also for the last years of the sample, one would have to extend the coe¢ cient vector as well as the components of the variance covariance matrix since posterior information for the parameters of the VAR is only available up to the last date in the sample. Even though the last observations of these elements would constitute the best forecast when the evolution of the parameters are modeled as random walks, imposing constant parameters on the last part of the sample appears to be overly restrictive and might omit important dynamics deriving from future parameter variation.
Given the current state of the economy, let t = P t D t P 0 t be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the VAR's time-varying covariance matrix t at time t. Draw an N N matrix, K, from the N (0; 1) distribution, take the QR decomposition of K where Q is a matrix whose columns are orthogonal to each other and compute the time-varying structural impact matrix as B 0;t = P t D 1 2 t Q 0 . Given this contemporaneous impact matrix, we compute the reduced-form innovations based on the relationship u t = B 0;t " t , where " t contains three structural shocks obtained by drawing from a standard normal distribution.
Impulse responses are then computed by comparing the e¤ects of a shock on the evolution of the endogenous variables to the benchmark case without shock, where in the former case the shock is set to " i;t + 1, while in the latter we only consider " i;t . The reason for this is to allow the system to be hit by other disturbances during the propagation of the shocks of interest. From the set of impulse responses derived in this way, we select only those impulse responses which at horizons t + k; k = 0; 1; :::; 4; satisfy the whole set of sign restrictions, i.e. jointly display the e¤ects on the endogenous variables associated with the structural shocks we wish to identify; all others are discarded. Within this loop, we also compute the price elasticities of oil supply and oil demand from all accepted draws of the impulse responses. 
